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Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza
Pandemic: Patent Realities
∗

Eileen M. Kane
ABSTRACT

A twenty-first century novel influenza A (H1N1) pandemic is
currently unfolding, and the eventual scope of this public health crisis is not clear. In addition, ongoing surveillance of the avian influenza A (H5N1) virus reveals outbreaks of human-to-human transmission of the virus with significant mortality. Effective pandemic
management depends on pharmaceutical intervention with two different clinical objectives: the generation of an immune response to
specific viral strains (vaccination) and the reduction of viral replication in an infected individual (antiviral administration). The ability
to offer pharmaceutical interventions for a public health crisis depends on three factors: development, capacity, and access. Pharmaceutical measures must be developed, capacity must be established,
and access must be ensured.
This Article discusses the three nodes of patenting that influence
the availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures in an influenza
pandemic. Identification of the causative influenza virus is the first
step in pandemic management. The virus and its RNA sequence are
both knowledge assets and physical inputs required for vaccine design. Vaccine development, therefore, will be influenced by any patents on the genetic sequences or proteins of the pandemic virus, as
well as on novel methods for vaccine production, the actual vaccine,
or adjuvant technology, all of which are relevant to the assembly of a
working vaccine on short notice. Pharmaceutical treatment of influenza infection during a pandemic could also rely on the use of patented antiviral drugs whose efficacy may be revealed as the pandemic unfolds. Unlike vaccines, these are not generally developed de novo
∗

Eileen M. Kane, Ph.D., J.D., Professor, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. A version of this Article was presented at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing
for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza in October 2008. The author
thanks the Symposium editors for their invitation and the other symposium participants for helpful comments on this work.
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for a pandemic, but their availability could be dependent on the exercise of patent rights by market incumbents. Patent rights could
control capacity, which may determine access.
Pandemic planning must consider how patenting can influence
development, capacity, and access to pharmaceutical interventions.
National and international public health authorities are slowly integrating intellectual property considerations into pandemic planning.
Further integration will anticipate the emergence of patent claims,
identify any relevant patents, encourage access norms, and consider
the use of legal mechanisms that could alleviate patent-mediated obstacles to the availability of critical products and methods that may be
patented.
This Article will discuss the patent nodes relevant to vaccine development and to antiviral distribution during a global influenza
pandemic, identify where such patents may facilitate or inhibit the
availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures, and offer preliminary
observations on the currently emerging novel H1N1 pandemic. The
goal of international clinical equality is essential for the eradication
of an influenza pandemic, and strategies for its achievement can also
be applied to other diseases.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Viruses have coexisted with humans throughout history, either
passively as biological background noise or as microbial enemies capable of causing both treatable and untreatable illnesses. Public
health menaces such as smallpox, yellow fever, measles, Ebola, HIV,
and polio are the result of viral infections that spread through popu1
lations, with the attendant consequences of morbidity and mortality.
A striking feature of viral diseases is the contrast between the seemingly simple nature of the infectious agent and the magnitude of
2
the disease toll that it exacts. For example, the HIV virus has nine
3
4
genes and influenza virus has eight genes, both far fewer than the
5
estimated 25,000 genes in the human genome. This apparent genetic simplicity, however, does not minimize the difficulty of developing
effective prevention and therapeutic strategies.
1

See MICHAEL B. A. OLDSTONE, VIRUSES, PLAGUES AND HISTORY 3–6 (1998).
Id. at 8 (noting that viruses are “nothing more than a speck of genetic material and a coat of protein molecules.”).
3
2 S.J. FLINT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF VIROLOGY 170 (3d ed. 2009).
4
1 id. at 512.
5
Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931 (2004).
2
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Influenza virus has a significant impact on human health. It is
not only responsible for annual seasonal outbreaks and periodic
pandemics, but it also draws the public health community into an
ongoing relationship involving both manageability and crisis. The
nature of an influenza public health crisis is a function of virulence of
6
the particular viral strain. An annual influenza season is characterized by the global spread of a viral strain with a fairly predictable pattern of disease and mortality, for which an annual vaccine is devel7
oped to contain the spread and lessen the burden of illness.
Nonetheless, it is estimated that approximately 36,000 deaths occur
8
in the United States each year from seasonal influenza.
Occasionally, an influenza strain particularly lethal to humans
develops, appearing first as an animal influenza strain that jumps to a
human host, and then becoming capable of human to human transmission. Influenza is capable of causing a pandemic, which is a public health crisis characterized by the following conditions: a new viral
strain emerges to which humans have no immunity; the viral strain
infects humans and causes illness; and sustained transmission occurs
9
among humans. Several pandemics have occurred in the last century. In the 1918 influenza pandemic, an estimated 675,000 Americans died as the result of an influenza virus with a relatively high mor10
tality rate of 2.5 percent. Later influenza pandemics occurred in
11
both 1957 and 1968.
Influenza is a segmented RNA virus with its genome divided
12
among eight segments. Influenza is classified into subtypes A, B,

6

Virulence is defined as the ability of a virus to cause disease, or pathogenesis. 1
FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 40.
7
See generally ANTHONY E. FIORE ET AL., PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INFLUENZA,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
IMMUNIZATION
PRACTICES
(ACIP)
(Aug.
8,
2008),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5707a1.htm.
8
Approximately 5–20 percent of the U.S. population is affected by seasonal influenza. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Facts About Seasonal Influenza (Flu), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2009).
9
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Questions and Answers About Avian
Influenza
(Bird
Flu)
and
Avian
Influenza
A
(H5N1)
Virus,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/qa.htm (last visited June 29, 2009).
10
Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., Initial Genetic Characterization of the
1918 “Spanish” Influenza Virus, 275 SCIENCE 1793, 1793 (1997). This mortality rate
compares with the more common mortality rate of less than 0.1 percent in other influenza pandemics. Id.
11
Richard J. Webby & Robert G. Webster, Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza?,
302 SCIENCE 1519, 1519 (2003).
12
1 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 511.
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13

and C. Humans can be infected by all three, but subtype A occurs in
14
both humans and animals, particularly in avian species. To date, at
least 3,455 human and avian isolates have been completely se15
quenced. Influenza viruses are further classified into strains and
clades, which are comprised of viruses sharing a common genetic
16
This organizational scheme allows epidemiologists to
structure.
track the dissemination of viral strains around the world. Humans
can also be infected by swine influenza strains that originate in pigs,
and in fact, pigs are thought to be an ideal “mixing vessel” for mul17
tiple influenza strains. These facts have important implications for
the spread of influenza, as some viral strains that first appear in animals can jump to humans, a host range capability that defines influenza as a potential human pathogen with an animal reservoir.
Such a virus is known as a zoonotic strain, capable of crossing the
18
species barrier. The clinical impact can vary across species, as an influenza virus that causes mild disease in animals may cause more se19
vere illness in humans. The existence of an animal reservoir makes
it unlikely that the virus can ever be completely eradicated as a potential human pathogen, in contrast to viruses such as smallpox and po20
lio, which lack an animal reservoir.
The traditional nomenclature for clinically significant influenza
viruses identifies the virus by its subtype and by two specific viral
genes that mediate the infectivity of the virus: the hemagglutinin
21
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes. There are sixteen known
22
types of HA antigens and nine known types of the NA antigens.
13

Id.
See 2 id. at 347.
15
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, The Influenza Genome Sequencing Project, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/research/resources/mscs/Influenza (last
visited June 29, 2009). The sequence data is available from GenBank, an international searchable online database maintained by the National Institutes of Health,
National Center for Biotechnology Information, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last
visited June 29, 2009).
16
Writing Comm. of the Second World Health Org. Consultation on Clinical
Aspects of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, Update on Avian
Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 261, 262 (2008) [hereinafter Writing Committee].
17
OLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 185.
18
1 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.
19
2 id. at 348.
20
OLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 185.
21
Ctr. for Infectious Disease Research & Policy, Novel H1N1 Influenza (Swine
Flu), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/index.html
(last visited July 19, 2009).
22
Id.
14
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Hemagglutinin is a viral surface protein that can elicit the production
23
of antibodies to the virus. The NA protein is an enzyme on the viral
24
membrane that facilitates the entry of influenza virus into a cell.
The dominant influenza subtypes currently circulating as seasonal
strains in humans are influenza A (H1N1) (“seasonal H1N1”), in25
fluenza A (H3N2), and influenza B (which occurs only in humans).
The genome of the influenza virus changes over time, leading to the
phenomena of antigenic drift (minor changes) and antigenic shift
(radical changes); the latter occurs due to reassortment of the genet26
ic segments of one or more viruses.
The possibility of human infection from an animal influenza virus means that no host immune defense may be capable of responding to and neutralizing an infection. Humans will be immunologically naïve to a viral strain with a novel HA protein and this clinical
limitation can explain how an influenza virus evades host responses
and causes disease.
This Article addresses the pharmaceutical interventions for an
influenza pandemic in the context of patent-related biomedical re27
search. It presents an initial overview of the pharmaceutical options
available for an influenza pandemic, followed by a description of the
official U.S. and international strategies to contain a pandemic. This
Article also identifies nodes where patenting could intersect with
scientific research and public health planning and discusses patentrelated obstacles that could impede the effectiveness of some public
health efforts, as well as the strategies that might alleviate those obstacles. Much is theoretically known about the influenza virus, but
the very nature of a pandemic is that a novel virus emerges that must
be deciphered before a containment strategy can be devised. A
chronological sequence of knowledge points can be identified that
map what we must know in order to properly prepare for a pandemic: how the scientific community obtains the necessary genetic and
biochemical knowledge about an emerging virus to design therapeutics; how adequate production of these agents occurs; and how the
general population gets access to these treatments. Patents may sur23

Writing Committee, supra note 16, at 263.
2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 296.
25
FIORE ET AL., supra note 7, at 9.
26
2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 141.
27
“Pharmaceutical interventions are the primary methods used to prevent the
spread of disease as well as to reduce morbidity and mortality caused by the influenza
virus.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: HHS NEEDS TO
CONTINUE ITS ACTIONS AND FINALIZE GUIDANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS
9 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08671.pdf.
24
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face at any of these planning benchmarks, and while they may stimulate investment in research, they can also become bottlenecks to the
widespread availability of knowledge or products necessary for pandemic management. Effective management of a pandemic, therefore, will turn on the development of both scientific and logistical
knowledge in order to merge research insights with an appropriate
legal infrastructure.
The patenting that may affect pandemic planning emerges from
a nationally based intellectual property regime. A U.S. patent is a
grant of rights to the first inventor that gives her “the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering [to sell], or selling the inven28
tion.” The patent term is twenty years from the date of the patent
29
application’s filing. Patentability turns on the satisfaction of criteria
which can be conceptually divided into two groups: those that apply
to the invention and those that concern the sufficiency of the patent
application itself. The invention itself must satisfy the requirements
30
31
32
for patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, and nonobvious33
ness. The written patent document (the specification) must meet
34
separate legal requirements for the adequacy of the disclosure itself.
The patent examination process that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) conducts is intended to result in the grant
of patents that have met all of these requirements, and the grant
35
therefore enjoys a presumption of validity. Patents in other national
legal regimes may be the product of similar legal requirements, but
some customization occurs, although generally against the consensus
requirements of the Treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS), which launched international patent harmoniza36
tion efforts in 1994.
28

35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
Id. § 154(a)(2).
30
Id. § 101. A patent may be granted for a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. See id. A drug compound is a composition of matter.
31
Id. The invention must be useful, as defined by the inventor. Id.
32
Id. § 102. A patent is barred by any public disclosure of identical subject matter. Id.
33
Id. § 103. An invention may not be patented if its subject matter would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Id.
34
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). The patent document is required to have certain
attributes pertaining to the actual description of the invention, including enablement, written description, and best mode. Id.
35
Id. § 282.
36
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1C, Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]; see also infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text.
29
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Pharmaceutical patents are a type of chemical patent, and patents may be multiply obtained for different aspects of an invention
related to pharmaceutical interventions: drug compound, method of
37
use, formulation, and production process. Drug compound patents
cover the active ingredient in the pharmaceutical product, while a
method of use patent can cover the use of the product to treat a spe38
cific condition. The potential for a pharmaceutical company to
hold multiple patents related to a particular drug product can ensure
a dominant position in the market. Molecular patenting in the age of
biotechnology also includes the possibility of patents on viral DNA,
RNA, or proteins—essentially, patents on the architectural compo39
nents of the virus itself. These attempts at patenting can be expected whenever a new microorganism appears, particularly when it
is the causative agent of a clinically significant disease such as the viral
strain eliciting a virulent influenza. Such patents are upstream in the
research and development life cycle in the sense that they attach to
the knowledge that could be essential for the development of actual
downstream therapeutics. As a result, this is a potential site of patentrelated obstacles to implementing the most effective responses to an
identified pandemic outbreak.
Patents are inextricably linked to the research and development
40
of pharmaceuticals in modern biomedical research. Depending on
the circumstances, patents may function to stimulate invention, but
specific monopolistic behaviors may also limit access to the products
of inventive activity. A question to be addressed is whether the predicted outlines of a pandemic health crisis generate the kind of planning that anticipates patent-related issues among the myriad legal is41
sues that arise in pandemic management. Do patent-related barriers
emerge in a pandemic despite careful planning by public health authorities? Can these be forecast and minimized?
Recent influenza pandemic developments have occurred across
two distinct virus outbreaks. The avian influenza A (H5N1) virus,
originating in Asia, has demonstrated limited spread to humans since
37

JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 38–39, 44–49 (2005).
Id. at 38–39, 44–45.
39
See Eileen M. Kane, DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 712,
723 (2004).
40
See THOMAS, supra note 37, at 4 (describing the consensus view that the availability of patent rights contributes to investments in pharmaceutical research).
41
Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law,
and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 133–34 (2007) (including intellectual
property issues among the myriad legal issues relevant to influenza pandemic management).
38
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42

2005, albeit with some mortality. Most official influenza pandemic
planning activities and documents to date have been targeted to the
possible acceleration of H5N1 to a pandemic strain capable of wide43
spread human infection. In April 2009, as this Article was in preparation, a novel influenza A (H1N1) (“novel H1N1”) virus was identified as the agent of an outbreak of respiratory disease that first
appeared in Mexico and quickly spread to the United States and oth44
er continents. This outbreak elicited a pandemic declaration from
the World Health Organization (WHO), which raised its global alert
45
to level six in June 2009.
Questions about the effective role of patents in the pharmaceutical field often focus on whether patents stimulate the development
of new drugs and whether patents inhibit access to new and existing
drugs. To these variables, the intermediate factor of capacity must be
added when a health crisis involves infectious disease. Capacity concerns whether the kinetics of infectious disease might be controlled
because appropriate pharmaceutical interventions have been produced and are available. Capacity precedes access. If access can be
ensured, are the pharmaceuticals in ample supply for the magnitude
of the health emergency? Without capacity, access will not follow.
Effective management of infectious disease is a race against time, as
the goal of public health authorities is not only to treat the infected
46
but also to prevent further outbreaks. Supplies and materials must
therefore be ready when clinical need is identified, thus requiring
advance preparation that estimates and prepares for worst-case scenarios.

42
See World Health Org., Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of
Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Reported to WHO (Aug. 11, 2009),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_08_11/
en/index.html. The WHO reports a global total of 438 cases and 262 deaths attributable to laboratory-confirmed H5N1 in the period from 2003–2009. Id.
43
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 1–2 (analyzing government efforts to plan for an H5N1 pandemic).
44
Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, As Swine Flu Circles the Globe, Scientists Grapple
with Basic Questions, 324 SCIENCE 572, 573 (2009).
45
Press Statement, WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan, World Now at the
Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_
20090611/en/index.html. The alert level is an indicator of global spread of the virus, not the severity of the disease. See World Health Org., Current WHO Phase of
Pandemic
Alert,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/
index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
46
Gostin & Berkman, supra note 41, at 126.
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In Part II, this Article discusses the current status of official pandemic planning for pharmaceutical interventions during an influenza
pandemic. Part III identifies the patent nodes that will intersect with
pandemic planning and pharmaceutical countermeasures: patents
pertaining to viruses, vaccines and antivirals. Full access to these materials is critical to an effective pharmaceutical response during a
pandemic. Part IV concludes with observations regarding how each
of these patent nodes present different patent-related issues and how
comprehensive pandemic planning can integrate intellectual property considerations in order to avoid patent-related obstacles during a
public health emergency.
II. PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS AND PANDEMIC PLANNING
The most significant pharmaceutical interventions that could be
available in a viral pandemic are drawn from two distinct approaches:
the administration of vaccines, which present a whole or partial virus
to a potential host in order to generate an immune response that will
be protective against a later infection, and the administration of antiviral medications, which are chemicals that interfere with viral repli47
cation. Although these two categories of pharmaceuticals comprise
the bulk of influenza-targeted research, other categories of pharmaceutical interventions exist, such as the development of monoclonal
48
antibodies which are administered to neutralize viral infection.
Nonetheless, the baseline preparations for a pandemic focus on the
49
development and stockpiling of antivirals and vaccines. The loci of
pandemic planning are public health authorities at the national and
international level, most notably the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the United States and the World Health Or50
ganization (WHO).

47

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: EFFORTS UNDER WAY
TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS ON USING ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES TO FORESTALL A
PANDEMIC 4 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0892.pdf.
48
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Insts. Of Health, Researchers Find Quick Way to
Make Human Monoclonal Antibodies Against Flu (Apr. 30, 2008), available at
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2008/humanMonoclonal.htm; Jianhua Sui et al., Structural and Functional Bases for Broad-Spectrum Neutralization of Avian
and Human Influenza A Viruses, 16 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 265,
270 (2009) (reporting the possible development of monoclonal antibodies which
would neutralize many influenza A viral strains).
49
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 9–14.
50
See World Health Org., Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/influenza/pandemic/en/ (last visited October 7, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf.
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Active medical management of an influenza outbreak can occur
at two temporal stages: 1) prevention of a possible outbreak or limiting further spread of a virulent viral strain, or 2) treatment of existing
infections. Public health planning for a possible pandemic includes
both strategies. Successful responses will occur against a backdrop of
monitoring and surveillance by public health authorities, as they continually assess the dynamic status of an ongoing pandemic threat.
The recent outbreak of a novel H1N1 influenza occurred in the
51
U.S. and Mexico. This episode displayed the sequence of knowledge that begins to appear regarding a possibly pandemic virus outbreak. The viral strain is genetically typed and assessed for its susceptibility to existing antiviral drugs. Full genetic sequencing is also
necessary, as early and public dissemination of viral genetic sequences is critical to establishing global diagnostic capabilities and
initiating vaccine development.
To prepare an adequate response to the newly identified virus
with pharmaceutical countermeasures, pandemic planners need to
determine the scientific basis for identifying the most effective vaccine and antiviral medications, locate production capabilities, and
achieve stockpiling and distribution mechanisms for these pharmaceuticals. Next, this Article considers specific issues related to vaccines and antivirals.
A. Vaccines
Vaccines have been described as “the single most important
52
pharmaceutical intervention during a pandemic.” To lead the effort
to develop effective vaccines in a timely fashion, WHO has established
the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), which aggregates
all the national influenza centers and the four WHO Collaborating
Centers into a unified mechanism for the identification of novel influenza strains and consensus decision making regarding vaccine de53
sign. The occurrence of seasonal influenza demands that an annual
vaccine composition be designed to reflect adequately the current
antigenic status of the prevailing virus. The annual recommendations for the composition of the seasonal vaccine are set forth by

51

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in
Two Children – Southern California, March-April 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 400, 400 (Apr. 21, 2009); Cohen & Enserink, supra note 44, at 573.
52
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 2.
53
World Health Org., WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/surveillance/en/ (last visited June 29,
2009).
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54

GISN. For example, the vaccine for the U.S. 2008–2009 influenza
season was a trivalent composition composed of three circulating
55
strains, designed to protect against the most likely sources of illness.
Formal pandemic planning has considered vaccine development
on two fronts: a pre-pandemic vaccine, based on circulating viral
strains with pandemic potential and developed before such a pandemic, and the actual pandemic vaccines, developed from the virus
56
identified as the source of a pandemic outbreak. In theory, prepandemic vaccine elicits some limited protective immunity and may
be considered a “priming” action. The U.S. government has created
a stockpile of H5N1 pre-pandemic vaccine approved by the Food and
57
Drug Administration (FDA).
A vaccine—whether seasonal, pre-pandemic, or pandemic—can
be composed of a virus protein, known as an antigen, such as the HA
protein, or it may be composed of a whole but weakened virus. Official U.S. pandemic planning calls for the production of 600 million
doses of pandemic vaccine, enough for a population of 300 million to
58
receive two doses each. A key question in vaccine design is whether
antigen-sparing techniques, such as the use of adjuvants, will allow for
59
a reduced antigenic component of the vaccine.
The limitation on vaccine manufacturing capabilities in the U.S.
and globally represents a persistent source of concern. Several factors are responsible for this limitation. There have been technical
limitations in the methods used to grow virus stock, which traditional60
ly has relied on the use of chicken eggs. With this factor and other
54

Id.
The U.S. vaccine against seasonal influenza is constituted of the following: Influenza A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like virus; an A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2)like virus; a B/Florida/4/2006-like virus. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza
Virus
Vaccine
for
the
2008–2009
Season,
http://www.fda.gov/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PostMarketActivities/LotReleases/UCM062930 (last visited June 29, 2009).
56
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 24–25.
57
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING: UPDATE VI, at 2
(2009), available at http://www.kcercoalition.com/pdf/panflureport6.pdf. The development of a pre-pandemic vaccine can only occur for a viral strain which is identified as the source of a possible pandemic early enough to allow for development; this
fact distinguishes the H5N1 situation from the ongoing A(H1N1) pandemic, which
has emerged too quickly into full pandemic to allow for pre-pandemic vaccines to be
developed. See Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, After Delays, WHO Agrees: The 2009
Pandemic Has Begun, 324 SCIENCE 1496, 1496 (2009).
58
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27.
59
Id. at 61; see also 2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 271.
60
Catherine J. Luke & Kanata Subharao, Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 66, 69–70 (2006).
55
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realities of the production process, the time required to produce an
effective vaccine from the time that a pandemic virus is isolated has
61
been estimated to be four to six months. A further complication to
vaccine production is that only a small group of companies with
62
manufacturing capability exist. Finally, the production of a pandemic vaccine must be incorporated into the ongoing demand schedule for the production of a seasonal influenza vaccine. An initial
concern in the unfolding novel H1N1 pandemic has been whether to
include a pandemic vaccine component in the seasonal influenza
63
vaccine or to instead manufacture it separately. Both vaccines de64
pend on the same manufacturing expertise and infrastructure.
The U.S. has established the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),
which is a publicly-funded repository of materials required for emergency and public health crises, including pharmaceutical supplies
65
that are ordered and purchased from commercial manufacturers.
This reservoir of public health supplies exists to augment local public
health efforts. Pharmaceutical supplies are distributed from the SNS
within twelve hours to requesting states, and all supplies are free to
66
the public. International vaccine demand may be satisfied by the es67
tablishment of a WHO vaccine stockpile.

61

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 26–27.
The FDA has identified five manufacturers that are able to supply the U.S.
market with influenza vaccines. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza Virus Vaccine,
Trivalent, Types A and B, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/
ApprovedProducts/ucm094045.htm (last visited June 29, 2009).
63
Although the seasonal flu virus is an H1N1 virus, it does not cross-react with
the existing pandemic H1N1, so the seasonal influenza vaccine will not provide any
protection against the pandemic viral strain. See Maryn McKenna, Path to Swine Flu
Vaccine Has Major Hurdles, CIDRAP NEWS, May 1, 2009, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/
cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news/may0109vaccine.html.
64
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 26–28.
65
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile (last visited June 29, 2009).
66
Id.
67
World Health Assembly [WHA], Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, at 104, Res. 60.28(2)(2) (May
23, 2007), available at http://new.paho.org/hq/images/stories/AD/HSD/CD/
INFLUENZA/reso-60_28en.pdf. The resolution calls for
an international stockpile of vaccines for H5N1 or other influenza viruses of pandemic potential as appropriate, for use in countries in
need in a timely manner and according to sound public-health principles, with transparent rules and procedures, informed by expert
guidance and evidence, for operation, prioritization, release of stocks,
management and oversight.
Id.
62
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The availability of vaccines, therefore, will depend on a combination of scientific research and logistical infrastructure. Furthermore, patents may bear on the availability of both materials and methods necessary to the vaccine development process; this will be
discussed in Part III.
B. Antivirals
Antiviral drugs are molecules which have been shown to inhibit
the replication of a particular virus, making them particularly suitable
68
for administration after an individual contracts a viral infection.
The modern era of antibiotics is familiar to many who have been
treated for bacterial infections, but viral infections represent an entirely different research challenge for scientists. Because viruses must
enter the cells of an infected host in order to replicate and spread, an
antiviral drug must be developed to precisely target the virus without
concomitantly destroying the host cell. This is a difficult task. The
Food and Drug Administration has approved several classes of anti69
virals for influenza outbreaks. These drugs work by specifically targeting one of the viral proteins and inhibiting the ability of the virus
to replicate, thereby limiting infectious spread.
One class of antivirals with effectiveness against influenza are the
70
amantadines. These drugs target the influenza A M2 protein, which
71
is found on the internal nuclear envelope of the virus. Amantadine
and rimantadine are the most prominent examples of this class of
72
pharmaceuticals.
A separate class of antivirals is targeted at the neuraminidase
(NA) protein of the virus, the surface enzyme that must facilitate the
73
entry of a virus into a cell. The NA protein is one of the two influenza proteins (along with HA) whose genetic evolution directly
impacts which pharmaceutical interventions will be effective against a
74
specific viral strain. The most prominent example of the drugs that

68

2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 279.
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza (Flu) Antiviral Drugs and Related Information,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm100228.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (“The anti-influenza antiviral drugs are
not a substitute for a vaccine and are used only as an adjunct to vaccine in the control of influenza.”).
70
2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 280.
71
Id. at 291.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 296.
74
Id.
69
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target NA is oseltamivir, popularly known as Tamiflu. The FDA first
approved the drug in 1999 and it is manufactured in capsule form by
76
Roche, Inc. A second drug in this class is zanamivir, sold under the
77
name Relenza, manufactured and distributed by GlaxoSmithKline.
78
In contrast to Tamiflu, this drug must be inhaled.
The utility of preexisting antivirals in the treatment of novel viral
disease is not guaranteed. A number of variables interact to make an79
tiviral treatment uneven and ineffective. The most significant complication is the emergence of antiviral-resistant strains of a virus,
which have developed mutations making it possible for the virus to
80
evade antiviral inhibition. Such resistance is always a possibility in
the treatment of influenza and can account for treatment failures as
an influenza outbreak proceeds.
Authorities have already identified drug-resistant viral strains
81
during the 2008–2009 seasonal influenza outbreaks. Such a mutation can arise as the virus evolves against a backdrop of antiviral
treatment, where advantageous mutations that allow the virus to
82
avoid antiviral inhibition will be selected for and propagated. Epidemiological reports on the 2008–2009 influenza season suggest that
as many as 98 percent of the seasonal H1N1 viruses circulating in the

75
U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.,
Overview:
Tamiflu,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Searc
h.Overview&DrugName=TAMIFLU&CFID=21136746&CFTOKEN=f78ab56ebccbb50
6-30245DD4-1143-D1C5-FB6C4048A11F8F76 (last visited June 29, 2009).
76
Id.
77
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves a Second Drug for the
Prevention of Influenza A and B in Adults and Children (Mar. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm1086
22.htm.
78
Compare
Relenza,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Relenza,
http://www.relenza.com/relenza-faqs.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (noting that
Relenza is inhaled) with Tamiflu, Taking TAMIFLU, http://www.tamiflu.com/
taking/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2009) (noting that Tamiflu is taken orally in
pill or liquid form).
79
2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 279–81.
80
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Influenza Antiviral Drug Resistance,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/antiviralresistance.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2009).
81
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Influenza Antiviral Resistance and
Interim Recommendations for the Use of Influenza Antiviral Medications in the
United States, http://www2c.cdc.gov/podcasts/player.asp?=f10652#transcript (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009).
82
Id.
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U.S. have developed a mutation in the NA gene which renders Tamif83
lu ineffective against the protein, resulting in drug-resistant viruses.
Antiviral-resistant viruses seriously compromise the existing portfolio of clinical responses, whether for the treatment of seasonal influenza or a pandemic influenza. If the prevailing viral agent becomes resistant to a leading antiviral, the therapeutic options
diminish, and effective responses will depend on the availability of
vaccines that elicit an immune response from an infected individual.
The relationship between seasonal and pandemic influenza
strains is complicated; it is theoretically possible that a nascent pandemic viral strain can pick up mutations conferring drug resistance
from a more benign seasonal influenza (by a reassortment process,
84
described earlier). As a result, the new virus is simultaneously virulent and less amenable to treatment. Such a phenomenon is a reminder that advance planning for antiviral responses is necessary but
may be limited by the emergence of a viral strain resistant to stockpiled antivirals.
Planning for an influenza pandemic includes the stockpiling of
antiviral drugs. HHS has announced its planning goal of stockpiling
75 million doses of antivirals, adequate for treatment of about 25
85
percent of the U.S. population. These drugs are collected in the
86
SNS and additional drugs are maintained in state stockpiles.
The ability to use antivirals for containment of an influenza
pandemic is dependent on having adequate stockpiles of antivirals
87
assembled and within their shelf-life range. Research on the development of new antivirals for most clinically significant viruses (including influenza) continues over time. Nevertheless, pandemic
preparedness is likely to rely on those drugs with an established profile in targeting influenza, most particularly the influenza subtype A
that will be the likely source of any human pandemic outbreak be-

83
Nila J. Dharan et al., Infections with Oseltamivir-Resistant Influenza A(H1N1) Virus
in the United States, 301 JAMA 1034, 1034 (2009) (noting also that “influenza A[
](H1N1) accounted for 19 [percent] of circulating viruses in the United States”).
84
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
85
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 6, 54.
86
Id. at 19–20.
87
For example, manufactured Tamiflu capsules on sale in the European Union
have a five-year period before expiration; recent guidance from the European Medicines Agency suggests that these capsules may be used for an additional two years, if
needed, in an influenza pandemic. See Press Release, Eur. Med. Agency, European
Medicines Agency Recommendations on Extension of Shelf Life for Tamiflu (May 8,
2009), available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/humandocs/PDFs/EPAR/tamiflu/
28497109en.pdf.

KANE (FINAL EDIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

1152

2/4/2010 10:25 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1137

88

cause of its animal reservoir. Thus, by the time a potential pandemic is evident, effective planning will depend on antiviral capacity, not
development. This shifts attention to the mechanisms for manufacture and procurement of existing drugs for the designated stockpiles.
The government stockpiles will have been assembled to target critical
first responders, including medical personnel, as well as selected
89
groups of the most medically vulnerable. In view of the fact that the
national stockpile has only targeted capacity for 25 percent of the
population, HHS also recommends that private-sector antiviral stockpiles be established for the treatment of other workers and communi90
ties not essential to the first pandemic response.
Patenting antiviral medications has implications for establishing
full capacity in pandemic management, with further influence on actual access for individuals. This will be discussed in Part III.
III. PATENT NODES IN PANDEMIC MANAGEMENT
A. Viruses
The causative agent of an influenza pandemic must be determined by examining virus isolates recovered from one or more infected individuals. Viral stocks of such isolates are prepared by growing the virus in chicken eggs, the traditional method for preparing
influenza virus stocks, or in cell culture, which relies on the availabili91
ty of a cell line that will allow the virus to replicate.
Isolation of the virus itself quickly leads to the goal of determining its genetic composition, namely, the RNA sequences of its genes.
This research may generate potentially patentable materials, including the viral nucleic acid gene sequences, the protein amino acid sequences, recombinant vectors that host the viral genes as DNA or
92
RNA, and cell lines which carry the viral materials. Of course, the
goal of obtaining the baseline genetic structure of the pandemic virus
also allows for ongoing genetic detection of variants from this original virus, an accounting of any regional variations, and a determination of the ancestry of a particular virus.
88

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 29.
90
Id. at 21.
91
Lance C. Jennings et al., Stockpiling Prepandemic Influenza Vaccines: A New Cornerstone of Pandemic Preparedness Plans, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 650, 654 (2008).
92
Ben Prickril, Advisor, Pub. Interest Intellectual Prop. Advisors, Patent Landscape of H5N1 Influenza Virus at Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors Symposium (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2008/
lifesciences/patent_landscaping/lss1_ge_08_prickril.pdf.
89
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Public access to the genetic sequences of influenza A (H5N1) is
available from several sources, all of which are dependent on the provision of virus sequences from host countries. For example, the National Center for Biotechnology Information maintains an influenza
sequence database which collects the sequence data from the National Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Influenza Ge93
nome Sequencing Project and GenBank. An international consortium known as the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data
(GISAID) was launched in 2006 to gather influenza sequence data,
thus recognizing the need to establish consensus databases that
94
would allow open and rapid sharing of viral sequences. The guidelines for use of the database note the historical aversion to patenting
by influenza virus researchers for reasons related to the nature of in95
fluenza management as well as scientific norms. Nonetheless, researchers at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
filed a patent application advancing claims to protein sequences of
96
the H5N1 virus in 2008. In an effort to document the patent landscape of the field, the WHO has undertaken a project to map where
patents have been sought on any of the relevant H5N1 viral mate-

93
Yiming Bao et al., The Influenza Virus Resource at the National Center for Biotechnology Information, 82 J. VIROLOGY 596, 596 (2008).
94
Peter Bogner et al., A Global Initiative On Sharing Avian Flu Data, 442 NATURE
981, 981 (2006).
Scientists participating in the GISAID consortium would agree to share
their sequence data, to analyze the findings jointly, and to publish the
results collaboratively. Data would be deposited in the three publicly
available databases participating in the International Sequence Database Collaboration (EMBL, DDBJ and GenBank) as soon as possible after analysis and validation, with a maximum delay of six months.
Id.
95
GISAID Platform, http://platform.gisaid.org (last visited June 29, 2009).
Influenza viruses have not been subject to intellectual property rights
historically. This tradition has been important because the required
changes in influenza viruses contained in human influenza virus vaccines to match those viruses circulating currently in the field must occur at a speed far in excess of the legal process associated with the attainment of commercial protection. In order to allow rapid
development of products such as vaccines and other interventions on
an equitable basis by all countries and other interested parties, the
convention has been for human health professionals to share virus specimens and data openly without creating barriers of exclusivity such as
the filing of patents.
Id. Indonesia resumed supplying virus sequences to this database in 2008. Id.
96
Avian Influenza Vaccine, European Patent No. WO/2008/112017 (filed Sept.
18, 2008).
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97

rials. This research demonstrates that a small cluster of patent applications have been filed on various sequences and proteins of H5N1
and several patents have been issued, but the report further notes
98
that patent landscaping must continue as the field matures. The sequence of the H5N1 and novel H1N1 influenza viruses have been de99
termined. The WHO provided notice that genetic sequences from
one novel H1N1 virus isolate were available on the GISAID database
100
within several days of the first reports of the outbreak.
Some national public health authorities are concerned that their
public disclosure of regional virus isolates could lead to patents on
the viral genetic sequences that will impede vaccine design or limit
effective access to vaccines directed at the pandemic influenza strain.
A specific controversy over the prospective patenting of influenza sequences provided to international public health agencies occurred
with H5N1 in 2006, when Indonesia stopped providing virus isolates
101
from infected individuals to international authorities. The Indonesian authorities based their action in part on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which provides that countries are entitled to
benefit from the use of their genetic resources, and which the Indonesian authorities interpreted to include virus isolates from local
102
103
populations. That interpretation, however, has been challenged.
The appearance of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
104
in southern China in 2003 presented the world with a potentially
97
Prickril, supra note 92, at 15–18. The project focuses on patents bearing on
the actual H5N1 virus, rather than on auxiliary methods and materials. Id.
98
Id. at 18.
99
Rebecca J. Garten et al., Antigenic and Genetic Characteristics of Swine-Origin 2009
(H1N1) Influenza Viruses Circulating in Humans, 325 SCIENCE 197, 197 (2009); Kanta
Subbarao et al., Characterization of an Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Isolated from a
Child with a Fatal Respiratory Illness, 279 SCIENCE 393, 394–95 (1998).
100
WORLD HEALTH ORG., VIRAL GENE SEQUENCES TO ASSIST UPDATE DIAGNOSTICS
FOR SWINE INFLUENZA A(H1N1) 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.euro.who.int/
Document/INF/viral_sequ_25Apr09.pdf. The WHO published the gene sequences
of the viral isolate A/California/04/2009 A(H1N1). Id at 2. The document listed
the sequences of the major viral proteins, including the clinically important antigenic proteins, HA and NA. Id. at 1–2.
101
David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88–90 (2008).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 90–92 (stating that influenza viruses are not the kind of native genetic
resources contemplated by the CBD); see also Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett,
‘Sovereignty’ That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2008, at B7.
104
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – Worldwide 2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 226, 226 ( 2003).
The syndrome was named by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and a virus was
suspected as the causative agent. Id. at 227–28.
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lethal disease that was ultimately traced to a viral agent, namely, a co105
ronavirus. As scientists raced to identify and decipher the virus, the
question of patent rights in the actual viral genes and in therapeutic
pharmaceuticals complicated the coherence of an international pub106
lic health strategy to contain the epidemic. Three separate groups
of international researchers filed U.S. patent applications on the
107
DNA sequences of the virus. The U.S. group of researchers, based
at the CDC, ultimately received a patent to the DNA sequence that
108
they identified for the virus.
In the SARS crisis, the race to identify the novel pathogenic virus
was complicated by the accompanying patent-seeking on the DNA sequences for the pathogen. International public health authorities
expressed concerns over the possibility that patent rights would inter109
fere with the sharing of critical viral genetic sequences. The WHO
issued a policy statement that identified the nascent patent conflicts
over the SARS virus as a potential source of concern regarding the integrity of international cooperation and patient access to clinical
110
treatments. This WHO action served as a precursor to its later ef111
forts to encourage the sharing of influenza H5N1 virus sequences.
105

Matthew Rimmer, The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and
Access to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 335, 336 (2004).
106
Id. at 337–39.
107
Id. at 339–51.
108
U.S. Patent No. 7,220,852 (filed April 12, 2004). “We claim 1: An isolated
nucleic acid molecule consisting of the nucleotide sequences as set forth in SEQ ID
NO. 1.” Id. The patent recites a DNA sequence of approximately 30,000 bases. Id.
109
Rimmer, supra note 105, at 372–74.
110
World Health Org., Patent Applications for SARS Virus and Genes (Mar. 29,
2003), http://www.who.int/ethics/topics/sars_patents/en/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2009).
WHO intends to monitor the effects of patents (and patent applications) on the speed with which SARS diagnostic tests, treatments, and
vaccines are developed and made available for use and on the manner
in which prices are set for these technologies.
In the longer term, the manner in which SARS patent rights are
pursued could have a profound effect on the willingness of researchers
and public health officials to collaborate regarding future outbreaks of
new infectious diseases. WHO will therefore examine whether the
terms of reference for such collaborations need to be modified to ensure that the credit for any intellectual property developed is appropriately attributed, that revenues derived from licensing such property
are devoted to suitable uses, and that legitimate rewards for innovative
efforts do not impose undue burdens on efforts to make tests, therapies, and preventive measure available to all.
Id.
111

WHA, supra note 67, at 2.
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Overtones of national secrecy also shadowed the management of the
SARS outbreaks; the reluctance of China to inform public health au112
In
thorities of the magnitude of the crisis was severely criticized.
hindsight, the SARS crisis demonstrates that secrecy can result from
deliberate official concealment, but that the prospective patenting of
critical medical information can result in effective secrecy if it retards
the international sharing of virus sequences.
The SARS crisis appears to have launched recent formal efforts
by the WHO to integrate patent issues into its leadership activities regarding global health. The WHO established the Intergovernmental
Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property in 2008 to develop a plan for increasing the integration of patent
113
issues into global health planning.
The influenza viruses are both knowledge tools and physical inputs. Access to the virus and its sequence is not necessary only for
vaccine design. Global monitoring of a pre-pandemic or pandemic
virus is necessary for a number of reasons: to trace the ancestry of the
originating virus, to conduct epidemiological surveillance, to map regional virus variations, and to identify the antiviral susceptibility or
resistance of a particular virus strain. Thus, full and equitable access
to influenza viruses of interest is the critical foundation for understanding and managing the scope of an influenza pandemic and for
ongoing research. While patent law does not prohibit patenting isolated viruses and DNA or protein sequences per se, professional norms
that minimize patent-seeking on influenza viruses will enhance global
access to the viruses as research tools and will also remove any disincentives for public health authorities to fully cooperate in the information-sharing efforts that underlie pandemic management.
B. Vaccines
Effective vaccination of a population during an influenza pandemic awaits the identification of the causative agent necessary to
construct an effective vaccine. Authorities estimate the time frame
needed to design and manufacture a true pandemic vaccine to be at

112

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASIAN SARS OUTBREAK CHALLENGED
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES 15 (2004).
113
WHA, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, at 1–3, Res. 61.21 (May 24, 2008), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf.
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least five to six months from the declaration of a pandemic. Patents
with potential relevance to vaccine production include patents to viral genetic sequences that are necessary for specific vaccine design,
described in Part III.A, patents that pertain to specific technological
processes required for the manufacture of such vaccines, patents on
non-viral vaccine components, and patents on unique vaccine compositions.
Generally, vaccines that utilize the virus as an antigen can be
constructed by employing either the natural reassortment process in
which two or more viruses exchange segments to create a reassortant,
115
or through reverse genetics techniques from biotechnology. In reverse genetics, the desired viral segments are built into DNA plasmids
and are introduced into cells for the purpose of creating a novel virus
116
with the designated genetic composition.
Patents are held on the
critical technologies of reverse genetics, including the use of several
methodologies, such as the 8-plasmid system under patent to MedImmune, Inc., and the 12-plasmid system under patent to Mount
117
Sinai Medical Center. Over the last several years, MedImmune has
solidified its dominant patent position in the field of reverse genetics
methods by licensing a number of patents in the field from various
118
sources.

114
See World Health Org., Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process
and
Timeline,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/
h1n1_vaccine_20090806/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
115
Luke & Subharao, supra note 60, at 69–70.
116
Id.
117
David S. Fedson, Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy Agenda for Vaccine Development, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 19 (2005) (noting how critical vaccine method patents are to vaccine development). For an example of a critical patent on a reverse genetic method, see Helper-Free Rescue of Recombinant Negative
Strand RNA Virus, U.S. Patent No. 6,649,372 (filed Nov. 28, 2000).
118
Press Release, MedImmune, MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse
Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine (Dec. 7, 2005),
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=83037&p=irol-newsArticle
(noting that the portfolio includes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,544,785 and 6,649,372).
With this license, MedImmune has further strengthened its patent estate to now either own or have exclusive licenses to all of the key intellectual property (listed below) for this technology:
Mount Sinai School of Medicine Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO
01/04333)
MedImmune Fundamental Reverse Genetics Portfolio (WO
91/03552)
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Plasmid Rescue Portfolio
(WO 00/60050)
St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital Dual Promoter Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO 01/83794).
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The actual vaccine itself is not only an output from the research
and clinical processes but it may also be the subject of a patent. In
addition to the possible patenting of viral genes and proteins, described in Part III.A, the use of those molecules in the creation of a
vaccine with a specific pharmaceutical formulation can lead to a novel composition. Thus, the actual pharmaceutical needed to vaccinate
the target population may be a patented product, as illustrated by the
119
patents on seasonal influenza vaccines.
Patents that are auxiliary to the actual viral antigen or virus may
play as dominant a role in vaccine development as any actually sought
on the virus components themselves. For example, the use of nonviral chemicals that augment the immunogenicity of a vaccine—
120
known as adjuvants—is critical. Such compounds allow a vaccine to
include less actual antigen or virus, and thus allow for dose-sparing
clinical approaches that maximize the utility of the available viral
121
components. These compounds can be patented in isolation and
can also appear in patents that claim a vaccine as a specific combination of antigen and adjuvant.
Patent disputes can also be avoided by advance integration of
stakeholders into the patent-seeking process; such a model has occurred through the designation of joint patent ownership among
academic and funding partners in the development of an AIDS vac122
cine.
The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative has incorporated
the use of access-enhancing mechanisms into the patent licensing of
research that it has sponsored. Commercial licensing partners must
stipulate to “access commitments” that facilitate widespread availabil123
ity and agree to provide capacity levels and access.
This model
Id.
119
For an example, see Influenza Hemagglutinin and Neuraminidase Variants,
U.S. Patent No. 7,504,109 (filed May 20, 2005), which was assigned to MedImmune
LLC and contains product and method claims pertaining to FluMist, a seasonal vaccine manufactured by MedImmune LLC.
120
2 FLINT ET AL., supra note 3, at 271.
121
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27 n.62 (noting the
conservation of antigen achieved by using adjuvants in vaccine production).
122
HIV Vaccines: Patents for First AIDS Vaccine Specifically Designed for Africa Will Be
Jointly Owned, AIDS WKLY., Sept. 10, 2001, at 19, 19 (noting agreement among the
University of Nairobi, Kenya, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and the Medical Research Council, which removed patent-mediated obstacles to the testing of a
vaccine against an Africa-specific HIV virus).
123
INT’L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ACCESS THROUGH
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2007), available at
http://www.iavi.org/Lists/IAVIPublications/attachments/1238/IAVI_Promoting_In
novation_and_Access_through_Effective_Management_of_Intellectual_Property_
2007_ENG.pdf. “These commitments provide that any vaccine will be promptly reg-
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could be followed for HHS-sponsored research aimed at designing
124
improved methods for vaccine production.
There is precedent for incorporating access-enhancing mechanisms into government-funded programs that aim to combat infectious
disease outbreaks. The swine flu health crisis of 1976 emerged fol125
lowing the appearance of a virulent in the United States. An initial
outbreak at the Fort Dix military base was interpreted as an initial
126
event in a likely cascade of epidemic disease. Public health experts
127
advocated for the establishment of a national vaccine program.
The U.S. government recruited the leading vaccine manufacturers to
the production of national stockpiles and legislation prohibited
pharmaceutical manufacturers from making a profit from swine flu
128
vaccines.
Unlike most pharmaceuticals, the development of a pandemic
vaccine is likely to be initiated through a unique and coordinated sequence of events: public health authorities’ identification of a consensus virus for vaccine development, followed by vaccine design and
clinical testing, and then official purchasing by national governments
from commercial manufacturers to build stockpile capacity. Thus,
the development and capacity levels of vaccine resources are largely
initiated and designed by public health authorities. As a corollary,
access from these stockpiles is a function of official distribution, not
consumer purchase. Nevertheless, patented compounds or methods
required for vaccine production must be purchased or licensed by
public health authorities from commercial entities who may hold patents to any of these items. The willingness to license or the licensing
terms may reflect the patent-related considerations that enter the
transactional evaluation. Patents could affect licensing negotiations
through pricing mechanisms or limited offerings. In a public health
emergency, such as an influenza pandemic, recourse to one of the
patent-alleviating mechanisms available to governments is likely to
ease any emergence of refusals to deal or unreasonable licensing
terms. These mechanisms are discussed in Part III.D.
istered, manufactured in adequate quantities and distributed at reasonable prices in
the developing world.” Id.
124
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Announces Advanced Development Contract for New Way to Make Flu Vaccine (June 23, 2009),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/06/20090623c.html.
125
See LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A
WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 153–92 (1994).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 167–73.
128
Id. at 173.
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C. Antivirals
A hallmark of pandemic preparedness is the strategy of building
129
stocks of antiviral medications for the treatment of viral infection.
These compounds are chosen because of demonstrable success with
130
previous viral outbreaks. A pandemic viral strain, however, is only
identified after its clinical presentation; at that time, the effectiveness
of existing antivirals in reducing pandemic spread will be deter131
mined. If viral resistance to an antiviral has developed, the antiviral
stocks will not be effective and the clinical strategy of antiviral treat132
ment may not be possible.
The leading antivirals for use in an influenza pandemic are
those that target the NA protein of the virus, namely Tamiflu and Re133
lenza, and these are the focus of stockpiling efforts. Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate) was developed and patented by Gilead Sciences,
134
The company
Inc., a California-based biotechnology company.
then negotiated a Development and License Agreement for Tamiflu
135
Gilead sought to terminate that agreement in
with Roche, Inc.
2005 due to several material breaches, including underpayment of
royalties, as well as “Roche’s failure to use best efforts to commercialize Tamiflu by adequately and sustainably promoting and marketing
136
the product in all significant markets.” At the time, Gilead noted
that “[e]nsuring that Tamiflu is made as widely available as possible is
137
necessary for the protection of public health.” The two companies
settled after arbitration began and established a joint committee “to
oversee manufacturing, commercial[,] and pandemic planning for
138
the product.” The pharmaceutical that the FDA approved has six

129

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 12–13.
See id.
131
See supra Part II.B.
132
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
133
U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 18, 63.
134
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 75.
135
Press Release, Gilead Sciences Inc., Gilead Delivers Termination Notice to
Roche for Tamiflu Development and Licensing Agreement (June 23, 2005), available
at http://www.gilead.ca/wt/sec/pr_723430.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Press Release, Gilead Sciences Inc., Gilead and Roche End Tamiflu® Dispute;
Expanded Collaboration Includes Gilead Role in Oversight of Manufacturing and
Commercialization (Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.gilead.com/wt/
sec/pr_783456.
130
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listed U.S. patents, the latest of which expires in 2017. The patent
140
rights for Relenza (zanamivir) are licensed to GlaxoSmithKline.
The FDA-approved pharmaceutical has five listed U.S. patents, all of
141
which expire by 2014.
Effective pandemic planning requires the advance buildup of
antiviral stockpiles that are available in the event of an outbreak.
HHS has set a goal of keeping enough antivirals on hand for at least
25 percent of the U.S. population in the event of an influenza pan142
demic outbreak. These are kept in the SNS, which the CDC main143
tains. States are then assigned allocations of antivirals from the na144
tional stockpile.
The chemical synthesis of antivirals requires lead time and materials. In view of the synthetic complexity of the drug, Roche has
stated that it will maintain adequate levels of the chemical interme145
The demand for private
diates necessary for Tamiflu production.
139
E.g., Carbocyclic Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 5,763,483 (filed Dec. 27, 1996).
Representative claims illustrate how a pharmaceutical patent can cover both the
compound and the methods of clinical treatment:
[Claim] 1. A compound of the formula: ##STR74##. . . . [Claim] 4.
A method of inhibiting the activity of neuraminidase comprising the
step of contacting a sample suspected of containing neuraminidase
with a compound of claim 1 or 2. . . . [Claim] 6. A method for the
treatment or prophylaxis of influenza infection in a host comprising
administering to the host a therapeutically effective amount of a compound of claim 1 or 2.
Id.
140
See
Relenza,
available
at
http://www.biota.com.au/?page=1021002&
subpage=1021104 (last visited October 7, 2009).
141
See, e.g., Derivatives and Analogues of 2-deoxy-2,3-didehydro-N-acetyl Neuraminic Acid and Their Use as Antiviral Agents, U.S. Patent No. 5,360,817 (filed Nov.
10, 1992). Representative claims illustrate the claiming of the antiviral compound
itself and its pharmaceutical formulations:
[Claim] 1. A compound of formula (Ib) ##STR22## . . . . [Claim] 7.
A pharmaceutical formulation comprising a compound as claimed in
claim 1 as active ingredient together with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier therefor. . . . [Claim] 8. A pharmaceutical formulation suitable for intranasal administration comprising a compound as claimed
in claim 1 as active ingredient together with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier therefor.
Id.
142
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 54.
143
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 65.
144
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Antivirals—State Allocations,
http://pandemicflu.gov/professional/states/antivirals.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2009).
145
Lisa Schnirring, Roche Cuts Tamiflu Production as Demand Cools, CIDRAP NEWS,
Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/
news/apr2607tamiflu.html.
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stockpiling of Tamiflu also structures the production decisions of antiviral manufacturers.
The development of antiviral drugs relevant to treatment of a
pandemic influenza is likely to precede any pandemic outbreak as a
result of basic antiviral research, which is consistently concerned with
146
increasing the antiviral armamentarium in medical care.
As discussed, unlike vaccines, which must be designed to target a specific
causative virus, an antiviral drug can have a viral protein target which
appears in many influenza strains, thus making the treatment spec147
trum potentially wide. A specific influenza virus, however, may develop resistance to an existing antiviral, and this worrisome development has already emerged with the circulating seasonal H1N1
148
influenza strain.
If this resistance is genetically transferred to the
pandemic H5N1 or novel H1N1, then Tamiflu, for example, may not
149
be useful against one of these pandemic virus strains. Such a clinical development could render the stockpile capacity ineffective, but
cannot be predicted in advance. Stockpiles must be maintained despite the possible emergence of drug resistance.
Antiviral manufacturing can occur outside the cycles of pandemic emergence, and these drugs do enter the consumer market and
150
are potentially available through treating physicians.
Pandemic
demand, however, is likely to exceed the supplies in the baseline con151
sumer channels, so public health authorities must consider all
measures that allow antiviral reserve capacity to be established in advance.
D. Alleviation of Patent-Related Obstacles to Pharmaceutical
Availability
The availability of pharmaceutical countermeasures in an influenza pandemic, whether vaccines, antivirals, or both, could potentially be constrained by the existence of the patent rights discussed in
Parts III, A-C. Such complications can be anticipated and prepared
for by being aware of the legal mechanisms that recognize critical circumstances where compulsory access to patented inventions for third

146
Vincent Racaniello, New Influenza Antiviral Drugs, VIROLOGY BLOG, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.virology.ws/2009/01/28/new-influenza-antiviral-drugs/.
147
See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
148
See Dharan et al., supra note 83.
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., Tamiflu, How to Get Prescription Flu Medications,
http://www.tamiflu.com/getting/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
151
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, at 7.
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parties is essential for the provision of supplies in health emergencies. Recent crises involving other infectious diseases provide models
for the use of such measures when necessary.
Establishing full capacity for patented antivirals, if not acceded
to by voluntary licensing of relevant patents, might rely on the use of
152
compulsory licensing measures.
Unlike vaccines, where manufacturing capabilities are currently limited, manufacturing capability for
antiviral drugs can likely be more easily accommodated by a number
of pharmaceutical firms, including the roster of established generic
manufacturers. The province of public health authorities will be to
identify where capacity is lacking and to intercede in advance if the
patent holder cannot provide adequate supplies of antivirals in a
timely manner. As in all pandemic management, this is best anticipated ahead of time, due to the time lags in manufacturing and distribution that could limit the availability of treatment. Several legal
mechanisms are available to make patented inventions available for
use by third parties where the patent holder is unwilling or unable to
supply critical products in a public health emergency. Two routes are
available in U.S. patent law: the use of a compulsory license pursuant
153
to federal statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the use of
“march-in” rights to federally funded inventions pursuant to 35
154
U.S.C. § 203 (Bayh-Dole Act). On an international level, the TRIPS
treaty provides flexibility for countries to invoke the compulsory li155
censing of patented inventions in a public health emergency.
Recent public health crises suggest these mechanisms could be
effective in an influenza pandemic. The possibility of a bioterrorism156
related anthrax attack appeared in the U.S. in 2001. Anthrax is a
bacterial infection, not a viral one, but the possibility that an infectious agent would spread quickly through the American population
elicited a vigorous response from the government and the public

152
See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS AND
PATENT LAW ISSUES 9–10 (2005), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/
crs/RL33159_051118.pdf.
153
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) gives the federal government the right to use and
manufacture any patented invention, whether or not it is developed with federal
funding, and can also authorize third parties to do so, subject to the payment of
compensation to the patent holder.
154
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006) allows government
grantees (such as universities) to retain title to their inventions and engage in their
own efforts to commercialize such technologies.
155
See infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text.
156
Martin Enserink, This Time It Was Real: Knowledge of Anthrax Put to the Test, 294
SCIENCE 490, 490 (2001).
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157

health community.
Bayer, Inc., manufactured and held the relevant patents for Cipro, an antibiotic that was identified as the leading
158
therapeutic for those exposed to anthrax. The possibility that the
U.S. government might issue a compulsory license under 28 U.S.C. §
1498 to authorize third-party manufacturing of the leading pharmaceutical was very real and represented a significant departure from
159
existing reluctance to exercise such power. HHS raised the specter
of the compulsory license because of its concern over the price of Ci160
pro, but did not invoke the provision. The price of Cipro was lo161
wered in the U.S. in response to the threat.
When the threat of an H5N1 pandemic emerged in 2005, some
legislators called for a compulsory license under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
increase the manufacture of Tamiflu for the treatment of H5N1 when
it appeared that Roche might not be able to satisfy demand as the
162
sole manufacturer. Against this backdrop, Roche agreed to license
several generic manufacturers to make Tamiflu in order to increase
163
the stock of antivirals available in the U.S.
The challenge of ensuring access to antivirals during major viral
illness is also illustrated by the prolonged AIDS epidemic, which
arose in the early 1980s and is now responsible for a global death toll
164
that exceeds twenty-five million. Patented antivirals targeting HIV
157

Id.
Matthew Herper, Cipro, Anthrax and the Perils of Patents, FORBES.COM, Oct. 17,
2001, http://www.forbes.com/2001/10/17/1017cipro.html.
159
Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1.
160
Id.
161
Keith Bradsher, Bayer Halves Price for Cipro, but Rivals Offer Drugs Free, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at A4.
162
Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, As Avian Flu Closes in on U.S.,
Schumer Calls for Immediate Action: Demands Suspension of Tamiflu Patent So
Vaccine Can Be Mass-Produced, Dramatically Increasing Supply (Oct. 16, 2005),
available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=260246.
163
Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Praises Agreements with
Two Major U.S. Generic Drug Companies to Increase Supply of Tamiflu to Help
Stockpile Against Potential Avian Flu Pandemic (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record_print.cfm?id=260068.
Roche will continue working with these companies until the bottleneck
of supply for government stockpiling purposes has been relieved, at
which point they may regain their status as sole manufacturer. The
purpose here is not to break the patent on Tamiflu, but rather to meet
an emergency need for quantities of this drug that Roche itself simply
cannot do alone.
Id.
164
AVERT,
Global
HIV/AIDS
Estimates,
End
of
2007,
http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm (last visited June 29, 2009).
158
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(antiretrovirals known as ARVs) have been developed and effective
therapeutic regimens have been established; however, there has been
no express guarantee of treatment in the U.S., for example, and
165
access has been even more irregular in poorer countries.
The challenge of ensuring access to ARVs for U.S. AIDS patients
led to attempts to invoke the legal mechanism provided by the BayhDole Act, the 1980 statute that allowed recipients of federal funds to
166
seek patent protection for inventions made with these funds. The
statute allows the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to “march-in” if
reasonable pricing does not occur, but the unwillingness of the NIH
167
to employ this power has been catalogued and criticized. In 2004, a
400 percent increase in the price of the AIDS drug Norvir, manufactured by Abbott, elicited a march-in petition to the NIH, and the NIH
168
denied the petition. With respect to influenza, should any relevant
products or methods be determined to result from federally funded
research, this authority could be petitioned for. This possibility may
be more theoretical than real, however. March-in rights, having been
dormant through other cycles of demand for access to pharmaceuticals, are not likely to be a fruitful means to alleviate patent-related
obstacles in the future. Moreover, a pandemic crisis is likely to be
addressed with government-funded antivral stockpiles for general distribution.
HIV is a global pandemic, and controversies over access to antiviral therapeutic ARVs has implicated the patent regimes of many
countries, all constructed in the shadow of TRIPS, which launched
169
international harmonization efforts in 1994.
The treaty set up a
schedule for its signatories to establish a patent regime conforming to
165

See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 927 (2007) (noting divergence in
the ability of developing and the least-developed countries to obtain essential medicines).
166
35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). The Bayh-Dole Act allows government grantees, such
as universities, to retain title to their inventions and to engage in their own efforts to
commercialize such technologies. Id. § 207.
167
See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310–11 (2003) (recommending a more vigorous stance by the NIH regarding access to patented biomedical inventions made
with federal funds); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries?
Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2081 (2008) (noting history of
unsuccessful march-in petitions).
168
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, IN THE CASE OF NORVIR 1–7 (2004), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-in-norvir.pdf (NIH denial of march-in petition).
169
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 923–27.
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enacted standards, with delayed starting times for developing and the
170
least-developed countries. One such mechanism includes Article 31
of TRIPS, which allows the government to issue compulsory licenses
for the use of patented inventions in order to serve the public inter171
est.
Although the treaty itself is a trade-motivated vehicle, it has
been subject to the efforts of later ministerial conferences to enlarge
the scope of TRIPS as a means of furthering other social and political
goals. The most prominent example of this trend was the adoption
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
172
by the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in 2001.
This document elevated attention to public health outcomes as an
173
equally animating force for the utilization of TRIPS mechanisms.
Concerns over the marginalization of public health issues in the
TRIPS regime persist, and there are calls to further integrate the
174
WHO into the official apparatus of the administering authorities.
As the schedule for developing a TRIPS-compliant patent regime
has been structured for slower adoption by less-developed and the
least-developed countries, a number of countries with high numbers
of AIDS cases have yet to offer patent rights on pharmaceutical
175
drugs.
Several countries that have offered patent rights have encountered significant price obstacles to the availability of patented
pharmaceuticals and have sought to invoke some of the flexibility of-

170

Id. at 928.
TRIPS
Agreement,
supra
note
36,
at
1209,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm.
172
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
We recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented
from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life
or health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate,
subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with
the provisions of the WTO Agreements.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Kelley Lee et al., Bridging the Divide: Global Governance of Trade and Health, 373
LANCET 416, 420 (2009) (proposing that the WHO be officially integrated within the
WTO Secretariat).
175
Press Release, Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., TRIPS Council
Agrees on Extensions for LDCs on Pharmaceutical Patents (July 3, 2002), available at
http://www.ictsd.net/i/ip/39211.
171
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176

fered by TRIPS for public health purposes. HIV-related patent disputes are largely responsible for testing and defining the limits of
177
TRIPS patent-related flexibility. Brazil issued a compulsory license
for the manufacture of Efavirenz, patented by Merck, and Thailand
178
issued a compulsory license for Kaletra, patented by Abbott.
With respect to the treatment of influenza, Taiwan invoked a
compulsory license to use the Roche patent on Tamiflu under TRIPS
Article 31 in 2005, as fears of a global H5N1 pandemic were spread179
ing. Following this action, Roche voluntarily licensed the relevant
patent rights to generic manufacturers in developing countries, such
180
as China and India. This precedent is likely to encourage the actual
or threatened use of compulsory licenses by national governments as
soon as need is identified in any subsequent influenza pandemics.
Clearly, the issuance of a compulsory license to generate antiviral stockpile capacity can be invoked as a public health measure in
view of the fact that post-pandemic production will not meet demand
because the drug must be available at the first signs of an outbreak.
Therefore, capacity cannot be the function of market forces responding only to existing medical crises or the function of stockpile capabilities established in wealthier countries. Government authorities
must establish capacity either by direct purchase from the manufacturer or through other mechanisms. Antiviral drugs that are under
patent in a particular country could be subject to a TRIPS-compliant
compulsory license which authorizes third-party manufacturing for
181
domestic consumption, likely at government expense.
The precedents set by the HIV epidemic and the anthrax outbreak are highly relevant to the use of compulsory licenses in pandemic crisis. However, concerns over the emergence of an H5N1
pandemic in 2005 have already activated demands for the domestic
176

Debate continues over the scope of TRIPS flexibility for public health purposes; this flexibility has been limited by bilateral trade treaties. See Cynthia Ho, Current
Controversies Concerning Patent Rights and Public Health in a World of International Norms,
in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673, 685–95
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2009) (discussing the permissible scope of compulsory licenses issued under Article 31).
177
See Cynthia Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1484–89 (2007) (detailing the use of TRIPS-authorized
legal mechanisms to ease patent-related barriers to pharmaceutical availability).
178
Id. at 1485–88.
179
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 948.
180
Id.
181
See supra notes 171–173. The pending Article 31bis would allow a compulsory
license to issue for domestic manufacturing capacity that is used to export to nonproducing countries. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 929.
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use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, where necessary, and the actual use of the
182
These events, which grew
TRIPS Article 31 flexibility in Taiwan.
from H5N1 pandemic concerns, will also serve as a caution for patent
holders controlling future access to critical pandemic supplies,
whether related to vaccines or antivirals, alerting them to incorporate
public interest considerations when making decisions regarding their
patented properties.
Although most examples of compulsory licensing to patented inventions during infectious disease crises have involved the provision
of antiviral or antibacterial pharmaceuticals, the overarching legal
principles are applicable to circumstances where materials or methods required for either vaccine or antiviral administration become
limited by patent-related obstacles. Thus, public health authorities
should be aware that, despite the patenting of input materials (e.g.,
viral genetic sequences) or output products (e.g., vaccine formulation) as well as any production or treatment methods, any unreasonable prohibitions on the availability of such patented inventions can
be countered using the legal measures described above.
IV. CONCLUSION
The magnitude of a twenty-first century influenza pandemic
cannot be determined with certainty; however, the outlines of containment strategies are very clear and amenable to anticipatory development in order to optimize responses. There is no shortage of
government planning documents and organizations, both global and
national, that can facilitate the organization and availability of personnel, supplies, and communications during a pandemic. Although
most planning efforts to date have contemplated the emergence of
an H5N1 influenza pandemic, public health authorities were able to
rely on their broad outlines when the unexpected novel H1N1 influenza pandemic emerged earlier this year. As the world has
learned from both the HIV and SARS epidemics, effective international cooperation is a necessary condition to reducing the burden of
global infectious disease.
This Article has outlined how and where patenting scientific materials, technical methods, and pharmaceutical products can occur in
the development of pharmaceutical countermeasures for prevention
and treatment in an influenza pandemic. How do patents influence
development, capacity, and access? Three key nodes of patenting
emerge from the discussion: patents may control access to virus DNA
182

Abbott & Reichman, supra note 165, at 948.
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sequences and proteins, to vaccine production methods and actual
vaccines, and to antiviral drugs that treat existing infections. A key
differentiation between the impact of patents on vaccines and antivirals during an influenza pandemic emerges: patents can affect vaccine development, and subsequent capacity and access, but patents
will affect antivirals only at the level of capacity and access, as their
development will have occurred prior to a pandemic outbreak.
Despite the foreknowledge that pandemic planners bring to
bear if confronted with a pandemic crisis, an emerging infectious
outbreak will still present scientists and official authorities with a predictable set of unknowns that specifically relate to the particular microorganism responsible for the pandemic. In an influenza pandemic, the causative virus must be isolated and analyzed with allowance
for any regional or population variations. The medical community
will optimally want to deploy the pharmaceutical interventions of antivirals and vaccines. Several genetic realities will determine how
those modalities are deployed. The pandemic viral strain must be
identified and analyzed, requiring a full molecular analysis in order
to generate a viral genome and specific gene sequences. Effective
vaccine design requires scientific consensus regarding the virus chosen for vaccine development, followed by clinical testing to determine an immunogenic composition and a dose regimen that will
provide effective immunization. The viral strain must also be tested
for its susceptibility to existing antiviral agents in order to identify
which antivirals should be disseminated. The possibility exists that a
pandemic viral strain has resistance to one or more antivirals, in
which case the range of interventions may be severely curtailed, possibly shifting the bulk of the medical response to the development of
vaccines.
Patents may stimulate the development of a pharmaceutical,
e.g., the research and development necessary for successful production of an antiviral drug, but the same patented antiviral may be subject to the exclusive control of its patent owner, who is able to extract
maximal financial benefit from its position. In the case of pandemic
planning, two realities are evident. Advance capacity of any relevant
antiviral drug is required and access for infected individuals needs to
be widely available in order to achieve community-wide containment
of the infectious disease. A difficulty in pandemic planning is that
building advance capacity will depend on government ordering and
purchase, and maximal capacity will still be constrained by the ability
of a patent holder to control manufacture and distribution of the
drug. The 2001 anthrax crisis in the U.S. raised the specter of government exercise of its plenary right under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to allow
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third-party use of a patented invention, but this scenario unfolded
during the actual public health crisis.
In an influenza pandemic, the kinetics of infectious disease and
the realities of pharmaceutical production dictate several advance
considerations. Building effective capacity could exceed the production capabilities or allowances of a patent holder, and the government may have to consider using a compulsory license to achieve
adequate production, using third-party manufacturers and fully compensating the patent holder. But production planning must occur
with knowledge of the production schedule for an antiviral drug.
The actual synthetic processes can take months and thus prevent
manufacture of instantaneous capacity. Therefore, pandemic planners must include patent-dictated limitations on production capacity
and time constraints in pharmaceutical production when designing
how adequate supplies of an antiviral drug will be procured in a relevant time period. This Article has discussed how pandemic planning
requires the establishment of capacity following development in order to ensure access. One advantage of the reliance on public sector
establishment of capacity is that access is then controlled by public
health authorities who can distribute a drug without charge. The
challenge of access, therefore, could turn on the official prioritization
of access (e.g., first responders, medical personnel) rather than the
usual market-mediated mechanisms that provide access as a function
of price and financial ability.
If surplus manufacturing capability exists, the use of other compulsory licensing approaches is possible when considering the circumvention of patent-mediated limitations on pharmaceutical production. The theoretical use of the march-in rights afforded by the
Bayh-Dole Act is a possibility for inventions resulting from the use of
federal funds, even though this mechanism has not been successful to
date. Furthermore, the TRIPS-structured design of national patent
regimes includes the possible use of the flexibility afforded by Article
31 of the treaty, which recognizes circumstances where governments
may properly invoke compulsory licenses of patented inventions in
order to serve the national interest, i.e., the maintenance of public
health. Such mechanisms have been used to increase access to the
antiviral drugs required for treating HIV infection.
How can patent realities be recognized in pandemic planning?
Consider the integration of compulsory licensing measures into the
scope of legal powers that could be required in a public health emer-
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183

gency. In addition, when discussing official pandemic planning in
order to ensure that vaccines and antivirals are available, consider
where patented knowledge could impact pharmaceutical develop184
ment and where patented products could impact availability.
For
example, it is known now that patented methods for vaccine production will be required for use during a pandemic, and prospective licensing arrangements can be outlined in advance both to minimize
transaction time and to determine reasonable terms. Because pandemic vaccine production essentially relies on the same infrastructure
as that used for a seasonal influenza vaccine, all of the fundamental
materials and methods are known in advance to pandemic planners.
The crisis itself will simply supply the actual antigen or virus as the
key vaccine component. Hence, patents affecting the availability of a
virus protein or a whole isolated virus will be key determinants of
whether a vaccine can be rapidly produced. This Article discussed
why the patenting of influenza viruses may not surface as a potential
barrier, but this could be due to community norms rather than any
prohibition on obtaining such patents. Thus, pandemic planners
must be vigilant regarding any patenting of the key viruses and their
components.
There is no doubt that recent infectious diseases with global
spread, such as HIV and SARS, have accelerated the coordination of
international public health efforts, including the establishment of the
International Health Regulations by the WHO in 2005. A further
welcome development is the WHO’s recent recognition of the need
to integrate the management of intellectual property issues into international efforts to ensure the availability of pharmaceuticals for infectious and other diseases. Further integration would be enhanced
by the increased participation of the WHO and/or public health authorities as stakeholders in discussions on the intellectual property/trade treaty interface.
The ability to offer pharmaceutical interventions for an influenza pandemic depends on three factors: development, capacity, and
access. Pharmaceutical measures must be developed, capacity must be
established, and access must be ensured. Patents intersect with these
requirements in pandemic planning, and this Article has discussed

183

See generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 2009
INFLUENZA A(H1N1) OUTBREAK: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2009) (focusing only on liability and civil rights issues attendant to providing vaccines and antivirals).
184
Such issues are notably absent in such U.S. planning documents and reviews.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 27, (lacking any discussion of
patent-related issues related to the provision of vaccines and antivirals).
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where they may surface and how any obstacles may be managed. The
central role of public health authorities in an influenza pandemic alters some of the traditional trajectories for the development of critical pharmaceutical interventions, but official planning must still account for the presence of patented materials and methods. As public
health planners continue to deepen their awareness of the patent
realities that mediate access to pharmaceuticals—a development hastened by the demands of infectious disease outbreaks—the prospects
improve for a more comprehensive analysis of patents and their role
in public health. Pandemic urgencies are likely to deepen the impatience with any unnecessary obstacles that patenting may pose to the
provision of critical medical supplies, including pharmaceuticals.
The establishment of international clinical equality during public
health emergencies is essential and can provide a template for more
permanent efforts to achieve health equity for all diseases.

